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Economic Migration and Justice 
 
Harry van der Linden and Josh Clark 
 
Butler University and University of Texas, Austin 
 
ABSTRACT: Our main thesis is that the U.S. has a duty of justice to adopt an 
open border policy with regard to economic migrants because it is significantly 
responsible for the unjust social and economic conditions that bring 
such migrants to its borders. From this perspective, President Bush’s recent 
“guest worker” proposal is morally objectionable because it is designed 
more to serve U.S. business interests than the interests of the migrants. We 
address three objections to opening borders: it will worsen the economic 
condition especially of low-skilled native workers; it will harm developing 
countries by increasing the so-called “brain drain”; and it is preferable to 
discharge our responsibility to the global poor by increasing development 
assistance instead of adopting an open borders policy. 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, the United States has sharply increased its effort to keep 
temporary or permanent economic migrants from entering its territory. The 
Clinton administration doubled the size of the Border Patrol, built heavily fenced 
corridors along widely traveled segments of the U.S.-Mexico border, and, by the 
late nineties, spent around $5 million per day policing this border. In response to 
the security concerns raised by 9/11, the Bush administration has further stepped 
up the enforcement of our borders. It is doubtful, however, that these attempts 
to restrict illegal immigration have been very effective. Apprehensions along the 
border with Mexico increased from less than 1 million in 1994 to more than 1.5 
million in 2000, but this may simply reflect an increase in the number of attempted 
entries rather than real success in preventing unauthorized immigration. Apprehensions 
dropped sharply after 2000 and picked up again during 2004, mirroring 
such factors as fluctuations in the strength of the U.S. labor market and initial 
fear among migrants after 9/11 that visits back home would be unwise due to 
a greater probability of being caught upon return. It is estimated that there are 
close to 10 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., as many as half of them 
from Mexico, while total legal immigration during 1991–2000 was around 9 million 
and is at present around 1 million per year.1 The budget and efforts spent on 
preventing the hiring of illegal immigrants has always been small, which suggests 
that the purpose of more intense border policing is at least partly the political 
goal of giving voters with anti-immigration sentiments the idea that “something 
is done.”2 Increased border control has, however, brought significant costs to the 
economic migrants themselves. It has made it more difficult for illegal migrants 
to visit their country of origin; it has created a lucrative market for professional 
smugglers of people, with fees ranging from up to $2,000 to merely cross the U.S.- 
Mexico border to tens of thousands of dollars to make the journey from China 
to the U.S.; and, it has forced migrants to take more dangerous routes in order to 
escape detection, leading to several hundred deaths each year.3 
 
Opening the borders of the U.S. to labor migrants from the South and then 
providing them, after some years of work, with the option to become permanent 
residents or citizens would bring significant economic and social benefits 
to these migrants, as well as to their local communities and families at home. 
Our main purpose is to argue that the U.S. has a duty of justice to adopt such an 
open border policy because it is significantly responsible for the unjust social and 
economic conditions that bring economic migrants to its borders. We hold that 
many wealthy countries of the North have a similar obligation, but we will focus 
on the U.S. partly in order to keep the empirical part of analysis within limits. 
Our justice argument further implies that the U.S. should grant amnesty to its 
undocumented workers. From this perspective, we will briefly criticize President 
Bush’s recent guest worker proposal.4 The details of this proposal are still to be 
worked out, but its main features are that three year work visas, renewable up to 
at least six years, will be offered to undocumented workers residing in the U.S. as 
well as to new migrants with pre-arranged jobs for which U.S.-based companies 
could not find native workers. The proposal makes no commitment to greatly 
increase the very small number of permanent resident slots open each year to 
workers without special professional skills and it seeks to deport workers who 
become unemployed. 
 
Within the philosophical literature, the most common argument in favor of 
open borders is the liberal defense of an individual right to freedom of movement 
across the globe, as articulated, for example, by Joseph Carens. In this paper, we 
will briefly compare our normative grounding for open borders with this account. 
We will not try to address all the objections that have been raised against open 
borders but rather focus on objections particularly pertinent to our justice argument, 
including the arguments that there are better ways to improve the situation 
of the economically disadvantaged in the South and that open borders would 
harm developing countries due to increasing the so-called “brain drain.” 
 
Section I 
 
In Globalization and Its Discontents, Saskia Sassen argues that U.S. policy makers 
and the public at large wrongly see the causal responsibility for the immigration 
process as mainly lying with the immigrants themselves, while the role of the U.S. 
as receiving country is viewed as passive in this regard and as basically limited 
to asserting authority over entry. Sassen offers an alternative perspective that 
constitutes a good basis for developing our justice argument for open borders. 
On her account, the U.S. is actively involved in bringing about labor migration 
in that the globalization of the economy promoted and led by the U.S. facilitates, 
encourages, and directs this migration. The crucial causal links are that foreign 
investment in commercial agriculture in the South displaces subsistence farmers 
and that foreign investment in large-scale manufacturing for export further uproots 
traditional modes of life and creates even more workers willing to migrate. 
To be sure, foreign investment in export-oriented industries creates new local 
employment opportunities, especially for women, but these are often temporary 
in that after a few years younger workers are hired to replace more experienced 
workers who are more expensive and may encounter job-related health problems. 
Moreover, Western manufacturing plants tend to move after some years to more 
profitable locations in other countries. The overall result is that in many regions, 
notably in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America, global capital has 
created a large pool of potential immigrants. What makes migration to the U.S. 
a real option is that through foreign investment many potential migrants have 
become culturally, economically, and ideologically familiar with the U.S. and the 
West. By working in for-export industries, the migrants are exposed to capitalist 
production methods and consumption values, and envision a similar but better 
paying job in the U.S. The industries also have a broader ripple effect in making 
the general population more acceptant of Western culture and values. What settles 
the decision to migrate is that during the past few decades the U.S. has seen a 
huge growth in low-wage jobs in the service sector and also to some extent in the 
area of manufacturing. In the words of Sassen, “the internationalization of the 
economy has contributed to the initiation of labor migration flow to the U.S., their 
continuation at high and ever-increasing levels is directly related to the economic 
restructuring in the United States.”5 The recent decrease in labor demand in the 
U.S. (which might have bottomed out) does not really refute this point since the 
long-term expectation is that the demand, especially for low-skilled labor, will 
greatly pick up in the years ahead (partly due to demographic factors). 
 
Sassen holds that there are other factors that explain the emergence of specific 
immigration flows. She mentions past military interventions (e.g., Vietnam) and 
the impact of subsidizing sugar prices in the U.S., leading to 400,000 lost jobs in 
the 1980s in the Caribbean Basin.6 We may add that the current selling of subsidized 
agricultural products from the U.S. on the world market may have the 
same impact in developing countries that have moved (often under pressure of 
rich countries) toward greater import liberalization. A prime example of this is 
Mexico in the era of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where 
cheap and subsidized corn from the U.S. has forced many small and midsized 
Mexican producers out of the internal market.7 Sassen also does not discuss how 
the need for farm labor pulls many rural migrants to the North or how resource 
extraction by Western companies displaces farmers from the South. What matters 
most for our justice argument, however, is that her analysis shows that it is not 
simply poverty, economic stagnation, or cultural changes in the South that lead to 
labor migration, but rather poverty, economic development, and culture as they 
are significantly shaped, modified, and caused by the U.S. and its policies. Sassen 
concludes that the failure by most policy makers to grasp this point “has greatly 
hindered the fashioning of a fair and effective immigration policy.”8 
 
Sassen does not elaborate what a fair border policy would require. In our 
view, the U.S. should open its border to labor migrants and provide them after 
some years with the option of seeking permanent residency or citizenship, while 
undocumented workers should receive amnesty on the same terms. To provide 
illegal immigrants with work without providing them with basic protections 
against discrimination, wage exploitation, and unsafe work and living conditions 
is morally inexcusable. To show the moral bankruptcy of our current immigration 
policy one need only to note with Peter Stalker that the U.S. government does 
not seriously try to clamp down on undocumented migrant employment because 
migrant labor is essential to the economy, and thus we allow a policy to continue 
that “criminalizes millions of people—employers and workers alike.”9 
 
It is a merit of the Bush guest worker proposal that it recognizes that the present 
situation of undocumented workers is unacceptable, but the proposal fails 
morally and pragmatically both in how it seeks to change their situation and how 
it addresses the problem of illegal border crossings. It may seem that it is better 
to be a legally-recognized temporary worker than an undocumented worker, but 
the Bush proposal offers no guarantee that migrants will not be deported when 
they become unemployed or after their visa has been renewed more than once. 
Nor are they offered a good chance to obtain permanent residency or citizenship. 
So there is a clear disincentive to officially become a guest worker, for it is easier 
to deport such workers than undocumented workers. Also, the gain in terms of 
worker rights and protections might be less significant than it appears at first sight: 
temporary workers will only receive a visa renewal if they have an employment 
sponsor, and this makes them, and their very status as “legal,” unduly dependent 
on their employers. The dependency will be even greater with respect to new migrants 
whose admittance is conditional on having prearranged jobs. Further, the 
Bush proposal seems to ignore the fact that many migrants work in the informal 
economy, making it hard to get employer sponsorship for temporary visas. The 
upshot is that many new migrants may not opt for legal guest worker status and 
will continue to enter the U.S. illegally or they may simply overstay their visa, 
while many current undocumented workers may not apply for a temporary work 
permit in the first place. The only way that the Bush proposal might become reasonably 
effective is if laws prohibiting the employment of undocumented workers 
were strictly enforced, even in times of labor shortage. Considering the impact 
of corporate and business interests on U.S. policy-making, this development is 
not to be expected. 
 
Most importantly, the Bush proposal is morally objectionable because it ignores 
Sassen’s point that our economic, agricultural, and international security 
policies are considerably responsible for leading labor migrants to our borders. 
Allowing entry only to migrants with pre-arranged jobs seems to be motivated 
by what serves U.S. business interests rather than by recognition of this responsibility. 
Unjust policies of the U.S. trigger migration and admitting only workers 
with sponsors would add to this injustice, as would the deportation of temporary 
workers (and their families) that have become part of, and have contributed to, 
society. These workers also should not have to labor under the threat that such a 
deportation is always a possibility. 
 
It may be objected that since both the governments of developing countries 
and other wealthy countries share in the responsibility for initiating migration 
flows to the U.S., the case has not been made that it is incumbent on the U.S. to 
open its borders. In reply, it should be noted that in our view all wealthy countries 
in the North should open their borders and that many of these countries have 
migration flows to their borders for which the U.S. also bears some responsibility. 
Only if economic migrants would go to the U.S. in hugely disproportionate numbers 
could a case be made that the shared responsibility may be a ground for the 
U.S. to restrict admission after it had tried to convince other wealthy countries to 
adopt open border policies. It is doubtful that such a disproportionate migration 
pattern would develop in light of the fact that currently about one half million 
illegal migrants enter the European Union every year and that many European 
societies anticipate shrinking and graying populations in the decades ahead.10 
 
Further, the fact that the U.S. shares some responsibility with developing 
countries for the migration linkages to its borders does not count against the 
moral argument for open borders because the U.S. could have successfully 
pursued alternatives that would have led to much smaller migration flows. The 
range of options available to developing countries in this regard is much more 
limited and does not negate the responsibility of the U.S. The crucial point is 
that immigration patterns to the U.S. emerge from a background of political 
and economic hegemony of the U.S. and other wealthy countries of the North 
over most developing countries of the South. The hegemony involves a virtual 
monopoly on information, new technology, and scientific innovation, resources, 
and investment, and has led to a radical and growing inequality in incomes, 
wages, consumption, and wealth between the North and the South. During the 
past two decades, some of the mechanisms of maintaining and even increasing 
hegemony have been unfair trade agreements and the imposition of “structural 
adjustment” programs on developing economies by the U.S. dominated International 
Monetary Fund. The programs were initiated for improving debt repayment 
and have left the developing economies with a reduced public sector, curtailed 
social programs, and more production for export only rather than for local need. 
The unfair trade agreements include that wealthy Western countries have much 
higher tariffs on products coming from the developing countries than from one 
another and that they subsidize their domestic farm producers with large exports 
to the developing world, as we have noted with regard to U.S. corn exports to 
Mexico.11 Another unjust and beneficial arrangement for the affluent North is the 
“international resource privilege,” entitling transnational corporations to ownership 
over resources obtained from dictatorial regimes in the South.12 And, not least 
of all, the rich counties of the North, and in particular the U.S., have achieved 
their hegemony through the use or support of military force against struggles of 
resistance. With regard to all these mechanisms of hegemony, available alternatives 
are geared more toward promoting the interests and respecting the basic 
rights of the people of developing countries. Some of these are debt relief, fair 
trade agreements, upholding labor standards, increasing wages with increased 
productivity, treating resources as national wealth, and seeking investments with 
links to the local economy rather than limited to export zones. The cumulative 
effects of these alternatives would have been that only a fraction of the present 
number of economic migrants would have arrived at our borders. 
 
In sum, the U.S., its transnational corporations, and its citizens are morally 
connected to the vast majority of economic migrants arriving at its borders: the 
migrants often are direct victims of a U.S. dominated global capitalism, and 
certainly most of them have not been integrated into the global economy on fair 
terms. For practical reasons, the public policy of open borders should include 
all labor migrants from the South. (We will later address the issue of privileged 
labor migrants from the South.) The U.S. and its citizens have amassed a moral 
debt to the developing countries that grows each day with the deepening of 
global inequality. Of course, different people share in vastly different degrees 
the responsibility for the world’s deep inequality, but it would be a mistake to 
place the responsibility upon policy makers and corporate leaders alone. Most 
citizens share some responsibility in that they elect the policy makers and that, 
as consumers, they seek the lowest possible prices, thus placing pressure on 
companies to move to developing countries and exploit labor and resources.13 
Also, since the majority of the citizens of the U.S. benefit from its position of 
dominance, it is incumbent on them to seek to change the situation. Opening our 
borders to economic migrants is an important, even though far from perfect way, 
of slowing down the growth of our moral debt. It will economically benefit the 
migrants themselves, while their remittances will help their families or communities 
at home. A significant percentage of migrants may return to their countries of 
origin with newly acquired work skills or capital. They may also contribute to the 
democratization process in their home countries as a result of their exposure in 
the U.S. to pluralism, tolerance, and democracy, a benefit which is only likely to 
occur if the U.S. indeed extends fair treatment to migrants and lets them experience 
these values and practices first hand.14 
 
Section II 
 
Our argument for open borders is based on the premise that we have a duty of 
justice to assist people who seek to address an unjust situation for which we are 
partly responsible and from which we benefit. The duty itself is hardly controversial 
and has been discussed elsewhere, and so our focus in this paper is on such 
questions as whether the migration flows to the U.S. are indeed an injustice for 
which we are responsible and whether there may not be better ways to discharge 
the duty than to open borders.15 Our argument differs from how most liberals have 
argued for open borders. Their basic claim is that people have an individual right 
to freedom of movement and that it is unjust to deny entry to labor migrants; it 
is a violation of their rights. The problem with this view concerns the normative 
grounding of this right. Some liberals maintain that the right is a basic right, but 
there is no support for this claim in international law and it also lacks definite 
moral support.16 As Immanuel Kant argued, there is a universal right to visit other 
countries, rooted in the original common possession of the earth, but this does not 
imply, or should not be confused with, a right to settle. Kant applauded Japan for 
keeping out strangers with colonial designs and in our time a basic right to settle 
in any country would provide people from the North with even more opportunity 
to displace people in the South and deepen economic inequality.17 
A more tenable liberal defense of open borders, offered by Joseph Carens, is 
to view the right to freedom of movement as derivative from, and conditional 
upon, the liberal commitments to equal opportunity, freedom of lifestyle, and 
minimizing economic and social inequalities. He compares the U.S. and other 
rich countries with closed borders to medieval feudalist societies, in which the 
nobility (the citizens of highly-developed countries) permanently deny upward 
mobility (entry) to the peasantry (labor migrants from the South).18 His conclusion 
is that opening borders to the North is imperative because it would reduce 
the morally contingent inequalities in opportunity across the globe arising from 
one’s location of birth. 
 
At the outset, Carens’s approach may seem more attractive to supporters of 
open borders than our justice argument because he does not need to show that 
the labor migrants at our borders are deserving of admittance due to any injustice 
done to them by the U.S. No doubt, the very fact that the migrants arrive at 
our borders means that they anticipate improving their economic opportunities 
by entry and, on Carens’s account, they should be admitted if their expectations 
are realistic. Also, his approach can be used to support admittance to the U.S. of 
political refugees generally, while our justice argument morally grounds their 
admittance only if their oppressive governments receive significant U.S. support. 
Upon looking closer, however, the comparative advantages of Carens’s approach 
are rather limited. In recent years, refugee applications to the U.S. dropped below 
one hundred thousand, while on average fifty thousand new asylum requests 
were made.19 These numbers are small as compared to the number of labor 
migrants and have engendered much less controversy. In support of admitting 
refugees and granting asylum, we may simply appeal to the widely accepted 
view that all countries must admit some people who fear prosecution because 
all individuals must be able to live in some political community that protects 
their basic rights. What further reduces the seemingly significant comparative 
advantage of Carens’s approach is that we have noted that the empirical case is 
strong that most labor migrants arrive at our borders as a result of U.S. dominated 
globalization practices. 
 
Still, we are sympathetic to Carens’s view and our justice argument is not in 
any way exclusive of his view. The main weakness of his view is that it is based 
on the rather contestable premise that the U.S. should adopt a policy of promoting 
equality of opportunity for citizens and non-citizens alike. Carens argues for 
this policy along Rawlsian lines by pointing out that U.S. citizens in the original 
position behind the veil of ignorance would accept the policy because they would 
incorporate the perspective of migrants who stand to gain from it. But why would 
the citizens of wealthy nations be prepared to debate and settle such issues of the 
basic structure of society with non-citizens in the original position? In the future, 
global interdependence and cooperation might become sufficiently close to make 
it morally required to adopt global principles of economic justice, or, as Carens 
would have it, a cosmopolitan version of John Rawls’s domestic justice as fairness. 
At present, a much stronger claim can be made that at least specific interactions 
and schemas of cooperation, such as investment policies, trade policies, resource 
property rules, and labor and wage standards, should be just.20 Carens and other 
liberal defenders of open borders adopt the paradigm that immigration policy is 
foremost a matter of deciding whether the liberal state has the authority to keep 
people out, and thus they fail to note that it is because of very specific unjust 
interactions and policies initiated by wealthy countries that migrants appear at 
our borders (just as the nobility in feudal society actively shaped the conditions 
of the peasants). This fact generates more convincingly a positive duty of justice 
to open our borders than does Carens’s global conception of justice derived from 
an original position encompassing all of humanity for which the normative preconditions 
are not yet in place. 
 
Section III 
 
There are several objections to opening U.S. borders that have some validity if 
one assumes that it would lead to a rapid influx of tens of millions of permanent 
or temporary migrants. Such an influx of people might create public order and 
safety concerns, overburden social services, lead to serious unemployment, 
reduce the rate of participation in the political process, and even bring about 
overpopulation and severe environmental damage. The assumption of massive 
migration, however, is implausible considering how costly, both economically 
and psychologically, migration is initially to the migrants themselves. Further, 
what pulls most migrants to the U.S. is greater economic opportunity and once 
this would decline the number of migrants would lessen as well. At any rate, 
our justice argument for open borders does not preclude some border regulation. 
Entry may be refused to economic migrants whose criminal background or 
health prevents them from obtaining jobs. It is important that measures are taken 
upon the arrival of new migrants that facilitate their political and social integration 
as well as their economic success. Borders may be temporarily restricted for 
the sake of these aims. Funding for integration measures could come from the 
several thousand dollars that the U.S. now spends for every illegal immigrant 
caught at its southern border. 
 
Since 9/11, security concerns have become a much more important factor 
in determining border policing measures. We hold that long-term and genuine 
safety requires the elimination of U.S. policies that seek to maintain its economic 
and political hegemony, but it may be noted that our border proposal has definite 
security benefits. Once the flow of illegal immigrants across our borders comes 
to end, it will not be possible for potential terrorists to hide behind this cover 
when seeking to enter the country. More importantly, our proposal will lead to 
a great reduction of current social and economic networks in place that enable 
undocumented workers to live without legal interference. These networks also 
enable potential terrorists to live undetected in the U.S. Introducing his guest 
worker proposal, President Bush explicitly mentioned the goal of greater security, 
but his proposal will be circumvented by many migrants and so will be much 
less effective than our proposed policy in regard to security. It may be further 
noted that our proposal will also be more beneficial for the border communities 
that now suffer from a variety of the negative effects caused by large numbers of 
illegal migrants passing through their territory. 
 
Assuming a more realistic picture of a steady stream of labor migrants, there 
may remain worries about the long-term cultural impact of open borders, its effect 
on the welfare state, and its impact on wage depression. The first of these worries 
exist only for those who do not favor a multicultural society, while the second one 
is typically based on the failure to see that the weakening of the welfare state that 
has occurred in many Western countries is more the result of global capital seeking 
optimal investment conditions than an effect of labor mobility across borders. 
The third objection seems most pertinent to our justice argument in that one may 
wonder whether the increase in economic opportunities and benefits that opening 
borders brings to migrants will occur at the cost of the wages of many native 
workers in the U.S., especially of those in low-skilled jobs. A recent critic of more 
open borders argues that this problem already has occurred under the present 
conditions. The legal scholar David Abraham maintains that progressives in their 
support of a multicultural society as the outcome of the immigration patterns of 
the past few decades have become “class blind,” a blindness that has prevented 
them from honestly discussing that in the U.S. “immigration has made the mass 
of residents somewhat poorer, hurt the poor especially, and contributed rather 
significantly to the growing income disparities of the past twenty years.”21 
 
Abraham’s thesis about the negative economic impact of immigration is largely 
mistaken. Labor mobility across borders is not a major factor in explaining wage 
stagnation and growing economic inequality. Rather, as Sassen has shown, the 
very processes that gave rise to increased immigration over the past two decades 
in the U.S. also led to the income decline or stagnation of many workers in the 
North as well as to economic polarization.22 The transfer of industrial production 
to the South left a reduced and downgraded manufacturing base in the U.S. 
with proportionally more low-skilled and poorly paid jobs. This downgrading 
happened also because of technological changes in the production process, and 
wages were further suppressed by the practice of subcontracting. The service 
sector has grown enormously, creating well-paid jobs for “knowledge” workers 
(professionals and managers) who service the global economy and numerous lowpaid 
jobs requiring few skills and offering few or no benefits. High-paid workers, 
in turn, have increased the demand for personal services (childcare, cleaning, 
etc.) and often obtain these services in the informal economy. Immigrants have 
typically filled many of the newly created low-end jobs in both the formal and 
informal economy, besides continuing to work in such more traditional immigrant 
sectors as agriculture. Clearly, then, the main cause of income stagnation and 
economic polarization is not immigration but capital mobility within the global 
economy and the corresponding emergence of high-income “knowledge” jobs. 
So, Abraham is wrong in suggesting that more strictly regulated borders and 
greater opposition to immigration by progressives might have prevented these 
economic phenomena. 
 
Most economists hold that immigration does not negatively impact the rate 
of unemployment and has an overall positive effect on the economy. Some recent 
empirical studies, however, have tried to show that since the immigrant population 
over the past few decades had a greater percentage of low-skilled workers than the 
native population at large the wages of native low-skilled workers have decreased 
somewhat due to immigration. In brief, the problem is that a significant increase 
in the supply of low-skilled labor reduces the bargaining power of low-skilled 
native workers and leaves them with depressed wages.23 The empirical accuracy 
of the studies has been contested, but our proposal, it may seem, would definitely 
lead to the depression of the wages of low-skilled native workers because illegal 
immigrants tend to be disproportionately less skilled and they would arrive in 
greater numbers once borders are more open. 
 
In response, it should, first, be noted once again that the expectation is that 
there will be a large increase in the number of low-skilled jobs in the decades 
ahead. What further reduces competition between native and low-skilled immigrant 
workers is that the latter often take jobs—notably, dangerous, dirty, and 
arduous work—that native workers are much less willing to perform. Moreover, 
low-skilled migration benefits the least advantaged native workers by stimulating 
economic growth, by keeping industries operational that might otherwise have 
closed or left the country due to labor shortages or too high wage costs, and by 
encouraging some native workers to opt for acquiring more skills.24 Second, it 
may seem attractive to solve the problem of the depression of low-income wages 
by adopting a selective admission policy aimed at increasing the skill level of the 
migrant population. However, a policy of this sort is confronted with the difficulty 
of how to keep low-skilled workers out, while it also may be less effective than 
anticipated because high-skilled immigrants are prepared to take on less-skilled 
jobs. Most importantly, our justice perspective shows that it is wrong to make the 
interests of the native population the sole standard of admission policies. Even if 
open borders were to somewhat depress the wages of low-skilled native workers, 
this is not a decisive objection because even these workers share some responsibility 
for the processes that lead economic migrants to arrive at the borders. But 
the point is in a way a moot one, for our justice argument does not imply that the 
market must decide the “winners” and “losers” of more open borders and that the 
benefits of immigration may not be redistributed. We favor a regulated market 
with better wages and labor conditions for all low-skilled workers. 
 
This suggests a third and final response to the contention that open borders are 
a threat to native low-income workers. The objection ignores that income stagnation 
or decline for many workers in the U.S. is related to the fact that most of the 
newly created service jobs of the past twenty years have been non-unionized. One 
of the reasons that the economic and political elites in the U.S. often turn a blind 
eye to the employment of illegal immigrants is that they are difficult to organize 
and that the fear of detection keeps them from protesting inadequate wages and 
labor conditions. Accordingly, it is a great step forward that organized labor in the 
U.S. no longer supports the Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986) that penalizes 
employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, instead demanding 
amnesty for undocumented workers and penalties for employers who try to fight 
unionization by threatening to report or fire undocumented workers.25 A labor 
politics of solidarity, then, is gradually replacing a failed politics of exclusion.26 
In a similar vein, labor has rightly reacted negatively to the Bush guest worker 
program, noting that it is much more difficult to organize temporary workers 
whose visas depend on their employers than workers who are guaranteed that 
they will be able to obtain permanent residency if so desired.27 What organized 
labor still fails to see is that a policy of open borders is preferable to one of repeated 
amnesties for illegal migrants. It is a policy that will facilitate labor organizing 
across borders, and this is in the long run the only promising strategy for dealing 
with the wage depression resulting from capital mobility. 
 
Section IV 
 
The U.S. is selective in its exclusion of economic migrants in that it has a tradition 
of aggressively recruiting professionals on temporary visas. It has sought professionals 
in such areas as engineering, computer science, and accounting, depending 
on the varying market needs from year to year.28 Open borders would facilitate 
this recruitment, and this poses the following dilemma for our justice argument: 
We argue for open borders for the sake of improving the condition of the globally 
economically disadvantaged, but relatively privileged professionals trained with 
scarce public funds in developing countries end up benefiting the developed world 
and leave their own countries skill-poor. Some developing countries have lost 
a few percent of their professionals to the highly industrialized countries (India 
and China, 3 percent); other countries have suffered very significantly (Iran, 25 
percent; Ghana, 26 percent); and a few show nothing less than astonishing losses 
(Jamaica and Guyana, above 70 percent). In terms of specific professions, it is 
estimated that around 25 percent of all engineers and scientists trained in the 
developing world are working in the North, while in some developing countries 
up to 80 percent of their physicians have left (Malawi, Jamaica). A disproportionate 
number of professionals come to the U.S. The educational costs of training all the 
professional migrants who have left for the North runs into the tens of billions of 
dollars.29 Alison Jaggar has perceptively noted that the brain drain “also reflects 
a subsidy [to the North] from the unpaid labor of the women who gave birth to 
those professionals and maintained them into adulthood.”30 
 
Jaggar’s point is to argue that the subsidy provided by the South shows, among 
other factors, that the North is in debt to the South and that, therefore, the debt 
that the South has accrued through loans from Western banks should be cancelled 
as a matter of justice. In our view, Jaggar’s proposal should be extended beyond 
debt cancellation so as to address the injustices embedded in the brain drain: 
considering the contribution of Southern scientists and engineers to the industrial 
countries of the North, these countries should provide for science and technology 
transfers to the South. On the same ground, special discounts are warranted when 
the South wants to use patented drugs and technological innovations developed 
in the research centers of the North. Additionally, imposition of an exit tax on 
departing professionals to be paid by the hiring agency should be considered. A 
tax in the amount of a few months of salary would go a significant way toward 
compensating the sending countries for their educational costs.31 
 
Such measures may suffice in many instances to adequately address the injustice 
of brain drain with regard to the developing world and its economically 
disadvantaged people because it is also the case that the exit of professionals may 
have benefits for the country of origin. Migrant professionals in the North establish 
businesses in their countries of origin, send remittances, and develop networks 
with professionals back home. These professionals also may return temporarily 
or permanently with improved skills and more work experience. An increasing 
number of countries actively promote such developments, attempting to turn the 
brain drain into a diaspora of intellectual gain. Obviously, this goal will be easier 
to realize in developing countries with a surplus of professionals. In some cases, 
however, the loss of skills is so steep and concerns such essential services, such as 
education and medical care, that the benefits and various forms of compensation 
will be inadequate. It would be wrong to prohibit exit—the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights stipulates a right to leave one’s country (article 13.2)—but countries 
with huge and essential skill losses may demand that those who are trained 
by public funds commit themselves to serving their public at least for a number of 
years. And in such cases it would be unconscionable for rich countries such as the 
U.S. to actively recruit teachers and medical staff, among other professionals. 
 
More broadly, our justice perspective demands a reprioritization of admittance 
policies by the U.S. in case restrictions would be temporarily necessary for the sake 
of the successful integration of large numbers of immigrants. First priority might 
still be given to family reunification and refugee admittance, but with regard to 
economic migrants from the developing world, priority should be given to those 
with more limited economic opportunities rather than to the highly skilled. After 
all, less skilled workers in the South are more likely victims of the global economy 
than are its professionals. The lowest priority should be assigned to professionals 
from other countries of the North. Of course, the prioritization does not imply an 
absolute preference ranking: preference might be given to professional migrants 
in case of shortages so serious that they hamper economic growth and with it the 
opportunities for less skilled migrants. 
 
Section V 
 
Thomas Pogge has recently questioned the desirability of advocating more open 
borders as a way of discharging our responsibility to the global poor. He states that 
since there is much opposition to immigration, “the needy foreigners we manage 
to get admitted are very costly indeed in terms of the political effort necessary 
to get them in and in terms also of the hostility and anger they generate among 
our patriots, which makes it ever harder to enlist their support for any initiatives 
on behalf of the global poor.”32 For Pogge, we should focus our solidaristic energies 
on trying to convince our fellow citizens to donate to non-government aid 
organizations, such as Oxfam, that will be more efficient in reducing poverty than 
opening borders, or we should work toward the realization of some financial 
schema in the global economy that will generate funds for the global poor, such 
as a tax on currency transactions (the Tobin tax). These measures will reach many 
more poor people than opening borders possibly could, and the very poorest will 
be beneficiaries, whereas immigrants tend to be relatively less poor, having at 
least the means to travel long distances. 
 
It should be noted that Pogge does not argue that it would be just to refuse 
entry to economic migrants if one increases assistance to the global poor. Rather, 
his view is that we are dealing with two injustices: refusing entry is an injustice 
and the lack of a serious effort to eradicate global poverty by the wealthy countries 
through donations and other forms of financial assistance is an injustice because 
these countries are greatly responsible for this poverty. On Pogge’s account, 
working toward the elimination of the first injustice holds less promise for the 
global poor than seeking to overcome the second injustice and thus is morally 
the less desirable strategy of change. Still, the issue should be addressed here 
whether a trade-off between closing borders and increasing aid is not morally 
acceptable and even a preferable option. Such a trade-off would be defensible if 
our argument for open borders were based on the duty to assist the global poor 
as a duty of beneficence. Surely, benefactors have discretion with regard to the 
means of giving, and efficiency considerations may even favor increasing development 
aid rather than opening borders. The same conclusion may follow if 
one views (with Carens) the opening of borders as a way of seeking to promote 
equality of opportunity for all people.33 Again, a case could be made that more 
assistance to the global poor may contribute more to this aim overall than would 
open borders. Our justice argument, to the contrary, does not allow a trade-off in 
general terms. Our argument is that the U.S. has a duty of justice to admit labor 
migrants since it is causally and morally involved in the specific immigration flow 
to its borders. Were it not for the fact that these particular people were displaced, 
were trained in Western production methods, lost their jobs in for-export-only 
industries, had family or community links to other migrants in the U.S., and so 
on, they would not have arrived at the U.S. borders. Denying these particular 
people entry is an injustice to them because increasing development assistance 
in general is not helping them but rather other people who might in this way not 
become victims of injustice. Surely, once greater development aid—and, more 
broadly, better economic policies—reduced the number of people who are victims 
of U.S. policies, it would follow that fewer people would be treated unjustly by 
closing the borders. But our empirical analysis predicts that there would then 
also be fewer people who would want to migrate. Another moral consideration 
is that it is debatable that those who inflict an injustice should decide how it 
should be remedied. Even if there were some overlap between the beneficiaries 
of increased development aid and those who were the victims of U.S. economic 
policies, a case could still be made that if the victims would think that migration 
would be their better option, this remedy should be available to them as long as 
it does not lead to serious harms to others. Here it may once again be stressed 
that considering the great personal costs of migration, few people will take this 
option if real alternative economic opportunities are made available in their 
country of origin. 
 
To return to Pogge’s view about prioritizing our efforts of seeking to support 
the global poor, he is correct in holding that labor migrants are often not 
the very poorest, but he underestimates the economic benefits of open borders 
for low-income countries. The number of labor migrants to the North is small 
as compared to the number living in poverty in the developing world, but the 
remittances by these migrants are far from negligible. The amount of remittances 
that Mexican immigrants alone send back home (around $13 billion in 2003) far 
exceeds the total giving by U.S. citizens for combating global poverty and is 
about equal to all official development assistance (ODA) by the U.S., while remittances 
to the developing world are significantly more than the global ODA.34 
In some Latin American countries remittances exceed 10 percent of the GDP.35 
Open borders would increase and facilitate these remittances. Pogge also does 
not recognize other benefits of open borders, such as investment networks and 
the return of migrants to their country of origin with greater skills. Furthermore, 
Pogge overstates the political costs of getting migrants admitted, especially with 
regard to the U.S. where anti-immigration sentiments are less strong than in 
Europe.36 Addressing prejudices behind these sentiments is alone a good reason 
for placing open borders on the political agenda, but we certainly do not wish to 
suggest that open borders is a more urgent issue than increasing development 
aid. In theory, the moral arguments for opening borders and for seeking to alleviate 
global poverty through aid overlap significantly, and in practice there 
is essentially the same struggle for seeking to reduce and remedy the injustices 
inflicted on the South by the North. 
 
Our final goal must not be to find remedies for unjust economic practices, 
but to realize a global order that provides opportunities for the good life for all. 
The need to send money to Oxfam signifies a deeply flawed world, as does the 
existence of widespread migration that is purely economically motivated. Opening 
borders to the U.S. and other rich countries of the North still leaves the world 
deeply unjust. The receiving countries will benefit economically and culturally, but 
the immigrants themselves and their countries of origin will remain, to various 
degrees, victims of a world order with huge inequalities in income and economic 
opportunities. In a world without such inequalities, there will be no “globalization 
of mothering,” with women from the developing world working as nannies 
in the U.S. while their own children are left behind in the care of family or hired 
nannies; nor will there be villages throughout Mexico and Central America that 
have lost nearly all of their young people to the promise of “El Norte.”37 In a just 
world, the issue of open borders will cease to be contentious, for migration rooted 
in human freedom rather than in economic necessity will be much more limited 
in scope and will go across all borders and in all directions. 
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